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NOTES AND COMMENTS
to section seven the interpretation given to it by the Court in the
du Pont case is to subject all companies acquiring stock in good faith
to the hazard of having a legal transaction become illegal because of
unforseeable developments, 20 an effect which Congress may be doubted
to have intended.
ROGER A. HOOD
Trade Regulation-Unfair Competition-Dilution of Trade Marks
In Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co.,' Esquire magazine
sought to enjoin the defendant, a manufacturer of men's slippers, from
using the word "Esquire" written in any manner whatsoever on its
product, in its corporate name, or in its advertising. The plaintiff, in
the words of the court, "seems almost to contend that the word 'Esquire,'
except, usually abbreviated, as a form of address or title, as customarily
used in addressing members of the bar, has as a practical matter dis-
appeared from the English language except as the name of its maga-
zine.' 2 According to the opinion of the lower court in this case,3 5,000
persons in this country have adopted the word "Esquire" commercially,
including barber shops, service stations, and cafes. Even before the
plaintiff's trade-mark was registered, the name was registered for men's
furnishings, pipes, toilet articles, watches, and writing paper. In the
last few years, Esquire, Inc., has gone on an extended campaign to
acquire exclusive rights for its mark. This campaign includes "friendly"
letters, warnings of suit, and occasionally litigation. Apparently over
1,000 users of the word in unrelated fields have given up the mark under
plaintiff's threats. The plaintiff has gone so 'far as to claim that it is
protected against derivative words and that, therefore, "Squire's Home
for Aged and Convalescent," "Squire Market," and "Squire Realty
Co." are (or were) infringing on plaintiff's rights.4
Thus the question is squarely presented as to just how much pro-
tection the owner of a nationally advertised and nationally known mark
is entitled to receive from users in unrelated or at best distantly related
fields.
The plaintiff's hope for protection lies in an action for unfair compe-
tition of which trade-mark infringement is but a part.5 Unfair compe-
tition is an expanding concept and in arriving at its present status has
2 Neal, The Clayton Act and the Transamerica Case, 5 STA'. L. RZv. 179,
220-21 (1953).
'243 F. 2d 540 (1st Cir. 1957).
2Id. at 543.
'Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 139 F. Supp. 228 (D. Mass. 1956).
'Id. at 231.
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (1916).
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afforded relief under theories based on "simple" trade-mark infringe-
ment,6 confusion of source, 7 and, more recently, confusion of sponsor-
ship.8 Under the modern "confusion doctrine" all that is required is
that there be some reasonable likelihood that the buying public, through
the defendant's use of the mark, will believe that the plaintiff has in some
manner given its approval or endorsement, or a so-called "pat-on-the-
back" to the defendant's product. No evidence of specific instances of
confusion need be presented.9 If this element of confusion is present,
then the defendant may be enjoined from using the mark or required to
take steps to prevent the confusion.10
It would seem that this protection would be enough-to satisfy even
6 "The owner of a trade-mark has the right, not only to its exclusive use on
goods which he has manufactured, but also on goods which he may afterwards
produce, if they belong to the same general class as those upon which he has
been using the mark." William Waltke & Co. v. Geo. H. Schafer & Co., 263 Fed.
650, 651 (D. C. Cir. 1920) ("Lava" soap protected from "U-Lava" shaving cream).
Other illustrative cases include: American Tobacco Co. v. Polacsek, 170 Fed.
117 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1909) (smoking and chewing tobacco vs. cigarettes);
Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 Fed. 276 (C. C. D. Ind. 1900) (baking soda vs.
baking powder); Jacob Ruppert v. Knickerbocker Food Specialty Co., 295 Fed.
381 (E. D. N. Y. 1923) (beer vs. malt syrup) ; Wilcox & White v. Leiser, 276
Fed. 445 (S. D. N. Y. 1918) ("self playing" musical instrument vs. phono-
graphs) ; cf. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Decatur Brewing Co., 284 Fed. 110 (7th' Cir.
1922), where the court held "Blue Ribbon" beer not infringed by the use of the
name on malt extract primarily because of the inherent weakness of the mark.
I "The fundamental question in cases of unfair competition . . . is whether the
public is being misled and deceived, so that a defendant is in effect taking the
advantage of the good will and business reputation that a complainant has built
up through service or advertising or in any manner regarded as lawful and
proper." Anheuser-Busch v. Budweiser Malt Products Corp., 287 Fed. 243, 246
(S. D. N. Y. 1921). Other cases applying this theory include: John Walker &
Sons v. Tampa Cigar Co., 197 F. 2d 72 (5th Cir. 1952) (whiskey vs. cigars-court
said dismissal improper where there was a factual question whether or not the
defendant's use might cause confusion as to source); Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v.
Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (2d Cir. 1917) (self-rising flour vs. pancake syrup) ;
Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 Fed. 73 (2d Cir. 1910) ("Keepclean"
toilet brushes protected from "Sta-Clean" toothbrushes wvhen packaged in the
same manner) ; Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co. v. Sargoy Bros. & Co., 276 Fed.
447 (E. D. N. Y. 1921) ("Wearever" for aluminum cooking utensils protected
from use on tin wash boilers); Van Zile v. Norub Mfg. Co., 228 Fed. 829
(E. D. N. Y. 1916) (mark used on a washing aid protected from use on a powder
used as a germicide and cleanser).
'Hanson v. Triangle Publications, 163 F. 2d 74 (8th Cir. 1947), 26 N. C. L. Rv.
424 (1948) ("Seventeen" magazine granted injunction against use of name on
dresses for teen-age girls) ; Esquire, Inc. v. Maira, 101 F. Supp. 398 (M. D. Pa.
1951) (magazine granted injunction against use of name on men's clothing shop) ;
Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Bar, 37 F. Supp. 875 (S. D. Fla. 1941) (confusion was
found in that defendant had printed the name in the same manner as the magazine,
had used drawings containing plaintiff's "Esky," a bulbous eyed character, and
had used layouts from plaintiff's magazine; without these elements the case would
have been an interesting test for the "dilution theory") ; Cornell University v.
Messing Bakeries, Inc., 285 App. Div. 490, 138 N. Y. S. 2d 280 (3d Dep't), aff'd
inem., 309 N. Y. 722, 128 N. E. 2d 421 (1955), 6 SYRAcusE L. REV. 383, 41
CORNELL L. Q. 515 (1956) (Cornell University granted some relief from use of
name on bread).
'La-Touraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F. 2d 115 (2d Cir. 1946).
10 Cases cited notes 7 and 8 supra.
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the most selfish. In the principal case, the court relied on this doctrine
to enjoin the use of the word "Esquire" printed in "distinctive, dis-
jointed script" (as in plaintiff's trade-mark) on the defendant's slippers.
However, the doctrine was not broad enough to prevent defendant's use
of the word in its corporate name, as demanded by plaintiff. Apparently
the court felt that the use of this corporate name would not result in any
type of confusion that would entitle plaintiff to protection.
Plaintiff had based its claim for this broad relief on the newest, most
complete, and least understood available concept-the so-called "di-
lution theory."'" The rationale of the doctrine is that a trade-mark
possesses a certain amount of good will. This good will is acquired
through the distinctiveness of the name and its association with the
products of its owner. Therefore, the use of this trade-mark on any
other products decreases its distinctiveness, dilutes its meaning, and
harms the good will of the mark. If enough people use the mark, it
will lose all its distinctiveness and be worthless. To prevent this from
happening, the owner of the mark can stop anyone in any field, related
or unrelated, from using the mark whether any "confusion" in its
broadest sense is likely to result or not.12  A strict application of this
doctrine would obviously give plaintiff rights broader than those con-
ferred by even the copyright or patent laws,' 3 where protection is limited
to a number of years.
In the principal case, plaintiff was able to point to a Massachusetts
statute (Massachusetts law governed this portion of the case) which for
all practical purposes declares the "dilution theory" to be part of the
law of Massachusetts.' 4 Still the court refused to give Esquire magazine
"1 See Schecter, The Rational Basis of Trade-Mark Protection, 40 HARv. L.
REv. 813 (1927). This article is generally given credit for introducing the concept
of trade-mark dilution to American jurisprudence. Although Mr. Schecter did not
use the word "dilution," he did use such phrases as "whittling away," "dispersion,"
and "dissociation."
" See CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 84.2 (2d ed. 1950).
"3 See Middleton, Some Reflections on Dilution, 42 TRADE-MARK REP. 175
(1952).
1' "Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a trade name or trade-mark shall be a ground for injunctive relief in
cases of trade-mark infringement or unfair competition notwithstanding the absence
of competition between the parties or of confusion as to the source of goods or
services." MASs. ANN. LAws c. 110, § 7A (1954); See also GA. CODE ANN.§ 106-115 (1956); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 140, § 22 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1956); N. Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-C. Apparently the Georgia and Illinois courts have not yet
construed the statute. However, both the Massachusetts and New York courts
have balked at giving the broad relief apparently called for by the statute. For
example, the Massachusetts court, in refusing to give an automobile dealer pro-
tection for the use of the word "Parkway," stated: "The word 'Parkway' having
acquired no secondary meaning as designating the plaintiff's place of business, his
rights are not enlarged by [the statute]. . . !' Mann v. Parkway Motor
Sales, Inc., 324 Mass. 151, 157, 85 N. E. 2d 210, 214 (1949). The New York
court in reference to the statute has stated that "when the precedents are
examined carefully, they disclose that a plaintiff in order to prevail in an unfair
19571
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the broad relief requested. 15
It appears that the "dilution theory" is turning out to be something
less than the panacea hoped for by some. Courts tend to revert to the
age-old classification of strong marks and weak marks.' 0 A weak mark
cannot be made strong no matter how hard the holder tries, and since
it is already weak, it is already diluted and further dilution cannot be
enjoined as no appreciable harm results.17 While there is considerable
dicta to the effect that a strong, fanciful mark such as "Kodak" would be
entitled to protection from dilution,'8 there is no case that has justified
a verdict on the "dilution theory" that could not have been justified
under some branch of the "confusion doctrine."'1
No "pure" dilution case involving a strong mark has been found.2 0
competition case must prove either (1) that defendant has acted unfairly in some
manner, or (2) that defendant's activities have caused confusion or mistake, or are
likely to cause confusion or mistake, with plaintiff's activities, in the minds of the
public." Renofrab Process Corp. v. Renotex Corp., 158 N. Y. S. 2d 70, 76 (Sup.
Ct 1956). See Sterling Brewing, Inc. v. Cold Spring Brewing Co., 100 F. Supp.
412 (D. Mass. 1951); cf. Cornell University v. Messing Bakeries, Inc., 285 App.
Div. 490, 138 N. Y. S. 2d 280 (3d Dep't), aff'd mee., 309 N. Y. 722, 128 N. E. 2d
421 (1955).
1 In explaining the dilution statute, the court said, "This statute might be read
as requiring as a matter of law that in Massachusetts courts of equity in trade-
mark infringement and unfair competition cases give the plaintiff injunctive relief
no matter how weak the plaintiff's mark may be, against a defendant whose
actions create any likelihood of dilution of whatever distinctive quality the
plaintiff's mark may have. But so to read the statute would be to fly in the face
of the general principle that courts are not to presume a legislative intention to
rigidify the traditional flexible equity practice of granting or withholding injunctive
relief in the exercise of sound judicial discretion. Thus, in the absence of clear
mandatory words, we shall continue, until the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts gives clear indication to the contrary, to construe the statute as only per-
missive. . . . That is to say, we think the statute was meant to accomplish no
more than to permit injunctive relief in Massachusetts in suits for trademark in-
fringement or unfair competition grounded on dilution of a plaintiff's mark as well
as in such suits grounded on direct infringement." (Citations omitted.) 243 F. 2d
at 544.
'" "Names 'fanciful' in character are denominated 'strong.' These are designa-
tions which are generally not descriptive of the business, the persons involved, or
the place of business or operation. 'Weak' marks are words of common speech and
those descriptive of the locality or area where the services are performed or the
article used or made." North American Airline System v. North American Avia-
tion, 231 F. 2d 205, 209 (9th Cir. 1955).
"
7 Cf. Dobeckmun Co. v. Boston Packaging Machinery Co., 139 F. Supp. 321 (D.
Mass. 1956).
1"Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 243 F. 2d 540, 543 (1957);
Dobeckmum Co. v. Boston Packaging Machinery Co., supra note 17, at 323.
1" See e.g., Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc., 177 F. 2d 177 (1st Cir.
1949) ;, Wertheimer v. Milliken, 123 F. Supp. 358 (S. D. N. Y. 1954) ; Libby, Mc-
Neil & Libby v. Libby, 103 F. Supp. 968 (D. Mass. 1952). In these cases the
court based its decision on their "dilution statute," but confusion was obviously
available if the court had chosen to rely on it (in two of the cases, super-markets
adopted the name of a well-known national chain and in the other an individual
bought old X-ray film from the army marked "not fit for use," and sold it under
the brand name of the original manufacturer).2 In Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. Supp.
459 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1st
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Perhaps this is because if there is no possible chance for confusion, the
appropriator would gain little by the use of the mark. It is doubted that
the use of the name "Kodak" would contribute much to the success of
a bar and grill. The name "Aunt Jemima" might well be beneficial
to the maker of a ready-made cake mix, but it- would not be nearly so
helpful to the maker of fountain pens. Also, the stronger the mark, the
more likely it is that "confusion" in its broad sense will result from the
use of the mark in unrelated fields. Thus where a strong mark is en-
croached upon, it is relatively easy for the courts to base a decision on
"confusion," without having to rely on "dilution." 21
On the other hand, a weak mark by virtue of its descriptive nature
is useful to unrelated enterprises irrespective of any advantage to be
gained by association with the user of the same or a similar mark.
Thus "Eversharp" is equally appropriate for automatic pencils, knives,
and lawnmowers, and could conceivably be used for all three without any
confusion. In the absence of any confusion it is difficult to see that a
prior user is entitled to protection. Unless the use creates confusion of
some type, no one is gaining anything from the good will of another;
and it would be difficult to describe the conduct of a later user as unfair.
It thus appears that holders of strong marks are amply protected
by the "confusion doctrine," and that holders of weak marks are not
entitled to protection under the "dilution theory.".22  The "dilution
theory" may well prove useful in buttressing a weak "confusion" case,
but at present it does not seem likely to create any far-reaching changes
on its own. The statement of the court in the principal case that a trader
cannot "pluck a word with favorable connotation for his goods or serv-
ices out of the general vocabulary and appropriate it to his exclusive
use no matter how much effort and money he may expend in the at-
tempt"23 seems likely to survive attack until present concepts are greatly
expanded.
F. GoRDON BATTE E, JR.
Dep't 1932), aff'd, 262 N. Y. 482, 188 N. E. 30 (1933), the well known New Yorkjeweler obtained an injunction against the use of its name by a producer and dis-
tributor of motion pictures. The court in granting plaintiff an injunction discussed
the fact that "the real injury was the gradual whittling away of the identity and
hold upon the public mind of plaintiff's name," but evidence of public confusion
was introduced and the court at least in part based its decision on the latter theory.
In Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N. Y. Supp. 176
(Sup. Ct. 1937), the court in granting "Philco" radio an injunction against the
use of its name for razor blades based its decision in part on "dilution," but stated
that confusion was inevitable.
"See Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, 4 F. 2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925); Alfred
Dunhill of London v. Dunhill Shirt Shop, 3 F. Supp. 487 (S. D. N. Y. 1929);
Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (6th Cir. 1924).
" Cf. G. B. Kent & Sons, Ltd. v. P. Lorillard Co., 114 F. Supp. 621 (S. D. N. Y.
1953), aff'd per curiarn, 210 F. 2d 953 (2d Cir. 1954).
23 243 F. 2d at 543.
1957]
